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# Infosec for abortion-seekers
- URL: https://werd.io/infosec-for-abortion-seekers/
- Published: 2022-06-20T15:50:46.000Z
- Updated: 2022-06-20T15:50:46.000Z
- Author: Ben Werdmuller
- Tags: #Import 2025-06-13 09:23

![](https://old.werd.io/file/62b097470fae5b46ab445442/thumb.jpg)

We know from [a leaked draft decision](https://19thnews.org/2022/05/supreme-court-overturned-roe-v-wade-draft-opinion-heres-what-we-know/) that over the next few days, it’s likely that the US Supreme Court will issue a ruling in [Dobbs vs Jackson](https://reproductiverights.org/case/scotus-mississippi-abortion-ban/) that will eliminate federal abortion protections.

[Here, from my colleagues at The 19th, is what abortion laws look like across the US right now.](https://19thnews.org/2022/05/abortion-rights-restrictions-laws-in-your-state/) Many states have trigger laws on the books that will take effect as soon as federal abortion protections are eliminated. Notably, states like Texas make it illegal to *help* someone get an abortion, and [allow *anyone* to sue someone for doing so](https://19thnews.org/2021/08/texas-abortion-law-six-weeks-ban-would-do-more/). [Abortion travel bans](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/03/us-abortions-travel-wave-of-restrictions) are also looming: untested laws that would prevent someone from traveling to another state to get an abortion.

It’s remarkable that these sorts of restrictions should be placed on a woman’s right to choose what she does with her body in a democracy. It’s more remarkable still to see vigilante laws go into effect, and to see states weigh up legislation that denies people the right to choose whether to travel to a different state where abortion is legal. ([These restrictions don’t exist for assisted suicide, for example, after a Constitutional challenge.](https://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/oregon-ends-residency-rule-medically-assisted-suicide-83729883))

For most people on the internet, their information journey begins with a service like Google or Facebook. On these services, [your search history and other activity can be subpoenaed](https://www.steventituslaw.com/blog/can-google-search-history-be-used-as-evidence/), meaning that if you go to court, perhaps because someone sued you for trying to get an abortion, it can be used against you. [Pro-life organizations are already using Facebook to learn more about potential abortion payments.](https://revealnews.org/article/facebook-data-abortion-crisis-pregnancy-center/) Earlier this year, [a data broker was found to be selling data about people who visited Planned Parenthood.](https://www.vice.com/en/article/m7vzjb/location-data-abortion-clinics-safegraph-planned-parenthood)

So what happens if you do need an abortion? What kind of security stance should people take?

[The Electronic Frontier Foundation has a guide](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2022/05/digital-security-and-privacy-tips-those-involved-abortion-access) that sensibly describes compartmentalization, community agreements, and safe browsing. This is really important, smart advice, but it doesn’t go far enough in a world where your cellphone’s location data may reveal that you went to a clinic.

[A lot of location data is derived from the apps you use](https://themarkup.org/privacy/2021/09/30/theres-a-multibillion-dollar-market-for-your-phones-location-data), and it’s usually not obvious which apps send information where. A few years ago, it was discovered that [a Muslim prayer app shared information with the US military](https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/dec/03/aclu-seeks-release-records-data-us-collected-via-muslim-app-used-millions). It’s not inconceivable that an app wouldn’t, or isn’t, sharing data with law enforcement: although the Supreme Court ruled that law enforcement [needs a warrant to get wireless carrier location data](https://www.npr.org/2018/06/22/605007387/supreme-court-rules-police-need-warrant-to-get-location-information-from-cell-to), [it *can* buy location data from brokers](https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/04/26/constitution-digital-privacy-loopholes-purchases/).

Abortion isn’t the last stop for this kind of legislation or approach: gender affirming care and [even marriage equality](https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/more-than-abortion-rides-on-scotus-in-dobbs) may be on the docket. Even more broadly, we should all consider whether we want to live in a world where our every private action can be tracked and used against us. Miranda rights state that “anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law”; we’ve built a reality where anything we do can, too, whether or not we’ve been made aware.

The most effective protection would be a legislature that is in favor of an individuals’s right to choose and to privacy. [A group of Senators is seeking a ban on the sale of health location data](https://www.theregister.com/2022/06/17/bill-location-data-ban-roe/), following [a letter that was sent to Google CEO Sundar Pichai urging the same](https://www.wyden.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wyden-led%20letter%20to%20Google%20on%20geofence%20data%20and%20abortion-related%20surveillance%205.24.22.pdf). But failing legislative protection, pro-choice advocates need to begin building grassroots infosec skills and tools if they want to prevent this data from being used against abortion-seekers. Today, there is very little out there to help.

A few days ago, [I asked the question:](https://twitter.com/benwerd/status/1537558227419660289) *Who is doing the best work on infosec for women who may be seeking an abortion?* As of now, there are no good answers.

*Photo by [Manny Becerra](https://unsplash.com/@mannyb?utm%5Fsource=unsplash&utm%5Fmedium=referral&utm%5Fcontent=creditCopyText) on* [*Unsplash*](https://unsplash.com/s/photos/abortion?utm%5Fsource=unsplash&utm%5Fmedium=referral&utm%5Fcontent=creditCopyText)